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CRIMINOLOGY
THE PARDONING POWER-A WORLD SURVEY
LESLIE SEBBA*
The resilience of the power to pardon of-
fenders is a remarkable phenomenon, in view
of some seemingly powerful reasons for the
disappearance of this institution. These reasons
are both ideological and practical in character.
The ideological grounds derive from the fact
that the pardoning power appears to be an
archaic survival of an earlier era, during which
the State was governed by an omnipotent ruler,
who might have an occasional urge to demon-
strate his benevolent disposition. This seems
something of an anomaly in a twentieth century
constitutional democracy having a commit-
ment-at least in principle-to a delicate sepa-
ration of powers designed to ensure the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. This independence
would appear to be threatened by vesting in a
non-judicial authority the power to pardon of-
fenders duly convicted and sentenced in the
course of ajudicial process. It is no coincidence
that the ideological controversy regarding the
desirability of the pardoning power reached its
peak during the eighteenth century,' when the
groundwork of much of our prevailing political
theory was being laid. Thus while Montes-
quieu 2 believed that there was room-at least
under a monarchical system-for the institu-
tion of clemency, Beccaria3 advocated the total
* Institute of Criminology, Hebrew University, Je-
rusalem, Israel; Visiting Fellow, Center for Studies in
Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Penn-
sylvania.
I See, Sebba, Clemency in Perspective, in ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ISRAEL DRAPKIN (S. Landau & L. Sebba
eds., forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as Sebba].
2 DE IESPRIT DES Lois (G. Truc ed. 1944).
3 Let the laws, therefore, be inexorable, and
inexorable their executors in particular cases
•.. As punishments become more mild, clem-
ency and pardon becomes less necessary. Happy
the nation in which they might some day be
considered pernicious.
C. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTs 58-59 (H. Paolucci trans. 1963). Beccaria's fel-
low critics included Filangieri and the philosopher
Immanuel Kant. English critics, such as Fielding,
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abolition of this institution, a path which was
followed in France for a number of years in the
wake of the revolution of 1789.
If the ideological reasons for doing away with
the pardoning power are rooted in constitu-
tional theory, the practical reasons are related
to the development of modern penal systems.
The pardoning power has historically served a
number of functions, most of which are ade-
quately provided for today by other legal insti-
tutions which have been developed to meet
these needs. For example, the avoidance of
imposing criminal liability on persons lacking in
mental capacity or acting in self-defense is now
governed by the penal code itself. The need to
assuage doubts regarding the possibility of a
miscarriage ofjustice is now commonly met by a
system of appeals and rehearings before the
courts. The individualization of punishment is
provided for within the framework of the sen-
tencing discretion now generally bestowed
upon the courts, and subsequent developments
can be taken into consideration by parole
boards. Even the most dramatic use of clem-
ency powers, viz., the commutation of capital
sentences, has lost much of its importance in
view of the sparse use of the death penalty in
contemporary times. Finally, the use of par-
dons to secure rehabilitation, by removing the
stigma of a criminal conviction, has widely been
superseded by special laws providing for judi-
cial or statutory rehabilitation, or for the ex-
pungement of the criminal record.
4
It is not the intention of this survey to arrive
at any conclusions as to the desirability or use-
fulness of the clemency power in the contempo-
rary world; this is an issue which the writer has
considered elsewhere.3 The main objectives of
Eden and Colquhoun, concentrated their attacks on
the abuses evident in the exercise of the pardoning
power, rather than its very existence. See Sebba,supra
note 1.
4 See text accompanying notes 42-70 infra.
5 Sebba, supra note 1.
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this comparative survey of clemency provisions
throughout the world were to discover (1) the
extent to which the institution of clemency is a
universal feature of contemporary legal sys-
tems; (2) which bodies are formally invested
with decision-making authority to grant par-
dons; (3) whether those or other bodies hold
the reality of power in this respect; and (4) to
determine the main types and functions of
clemency under the various systems.
METHOD & SOURCES
The survey was conducted in the-following
way: in 1970 a circular letter was sent by Profes-
sor Israel Drapkin, then Director of the Insti-
tute of Criminology in the Law Faculty of the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, to some sixty
different countries around the world. The re-
quests were directed both to professional con-
tacts in those countries, and also, with the as-
sistance of the Israel Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, to official agencies. By this means infor-
mation was received from about fifty countries.
This information was later supplemented by a
study of the constitutions of these and other
countries, using material available from such
compendia as Peaslee's Constitutions of Nations6
and Blaustein's Constitutions of the Countries of the
World.' These sources were reexamined in 1976
to allow for subsequent developments, recent
political events having been cross-checked with
The Statesman's Yearbook 1975-1976.8 The mate-
rial compiled here is thus subject to the follow-
ing reservations: (a) the use of nonconstitu-
tional sources -primarily the codes of substan-
tive and procedural penal laws of the respective
countries-is selective, and is largely confined
to the countries from which responses to the
circular were received; (b) it may be that some
recent constitutional changes (especially in the
more politically volatile jurisdictions), have not
yet appeared in the above-mentioned compen-
dia, and thus will not be reflected in the analy-
sis; (c) the nonconstitutional provisions gener-
ally reflect the state of the law in 1970. These
provisions, however, being nonpolitical in char-
acter, are less prone to rapid change than the
constitutions themselves.
6 A. PEASLEE,CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (3d ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as PEASLEE].
7 CONSTITUTIONS OF COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A.
Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1971).
8 THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1975-1976 (J. Pax-
ton ed. 1975).
THE COMPARATIVE TABLE
The schedule appearing below presents the
information obtained in a systematic fashion in
the form of a table containing data relating to
one hundred jurisdictions. The table is con-
fined to those items on which information was
most forthcoming, namely: the legal source of
the pardoning authority; the mechanism
whereby pardoning decisions are made; cate-
gories of offences or penalties which are ex-
cluded from the pardoning power or for which
special provisions are made; and the types of
pardon available in the jurisdiction concerned.
Certain points of clarification, as well as addi-
tional information of interest, such as statistical
data, are presented in the right-hand column.
The salient features of the survey, as well as
certain areas of interest not appearing in the
table (such as the relationship between the par-
doning power and amnesties) are discussed in
the following text.
THE EXISTENCE OF A PAIDONING POWER
Responses to the circular revealed that a
power to pardon offenders existed in all the
jurisdictions from which responses were ob-
tained. Moreover, the original library survey of
constitutions produced a similar result for
other countries, and in only one recently
adopted constitution was no reference to clem-
ency found. The 1975 constitution of the Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic of China is somewhat
skeletal in form and provides minimal informa-
tion on the functions of the various govern-
mental bodies. The Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, to which the par-
doning power was entrusted under the pre-
vious constitution, has the power to "enact de-
crees ... and exercise such other functions and
powers as are vested in it by the National Peo-
ple's Congress," which is "the highest organ of
State power under the leadership of the Com-
munist Party of China."'0 Whether the pardon-
ing power has been deliberately and finally
omitted from the state fabric is thus as yet
unclear.
Subject to this exception, the overall picture
which emerges is that neither ideological nor
practical objections to the clemency power as a
legal institution in the modern age have re-
I Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic
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suited in its omission from the constitutional
scheme. The institution of clemency, having
survived the ideological attacks launched
against it by eighteenth century political theor-
ists, seems to have been no more intimidated by
the encroachment of competing institutions de-
veloped by twentieth century penal systems.
Thus Beccaria's vision of a clemency-free mil-
lenium does not seem to have drawn percepti-
bly nearer.
THE LEGAL SOURCES OF THE PARDONING
POWER
The basic provisions for a pardoning power
are nearly always found in the state constitu-
tion, the main departures being "basic" or "or-
ganic" laws, which in effect take the place of a
constitution. Great Britain continues to rely on
the royal prerogative, a recognized feature of
her unwritten constitution, and this same pre-
rogative, as delegated, also obtains in certain
jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth,
such as in Australia and New Zealand. It should
also be observed that in countries with a federal
structure, basic provisions may be found both
at the federal level and within the constitutions
of the individual provinces or states." The ju-
risdiction of the federal pardoning authority is
not, however, necessarily coextensive with the
jurisdiction of federal courts and laws (as in the
United States). Thus, for example, in India the
President may commute the death penalty even
where state laws are involved.2
THE PARDONING AUTHORITY
A perusal of the comparative table below re-
veals that in the overwhelming majority of
countries, clemency powers are vested in the
n With the exception of Australia the present sur-
vey was confined to the federal or national level. For
a somewhat outdated study of the clemency power in
the individual states of the United States, see Neal &
Hager, Summary of tie Provisions of the Constitution and
Statutes of the Several States Relating to Pardons, 20 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 364 (1929). For a more recent analysis,
see Weihofen, Pardon and other Forms of Clemency, in
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 569 (S. Rubin
ed. 1963).
12 Cf. The jurisdiction of the federal authority in
Malaysia, where the Head of Federation's power to
pardon is confined to certain special cases and the
ruler or governor of the individual state retains such
power in respect of all other offences. See compara-
tive table, infra.
head of states, be it the president 3 or the mon-
arch.1 4 The vesting of the clemency powers in
the head of state is consistent with the popular
view of the pardon as a discretionary power
entrusted to the most elevated personage in the
land. Indeed, in this respect there appears to be
a degree of historical continuity with the pow-
ers of the formerly autocratic monarch having
been transferred to his constitutional successor,
who remains the ultimate font of mercy vis-a-vis
his erring subjects. Superimposed on this image
is an image which attributes the pardoning
power to the executive arm of government,
which retains the discretion to refrain in ex-
treme cases from absolute enforcement of the
laws of the land. This dual image depends
upon an identity of functions of head of state
and chief executive.
That the above picture is over-simplistic is
revealed by a study of the development of clem-
ency powers over the past two centuries and by
a close examination of the comparative table.
The historical point may be made by reference
to the constitutional histories of France and the
United States. In post-revolutionary France,
the acceptance of the need for a pardoning
power did not entirely dispel reservations about
the wisdom of concentrating the decision-mak-
ing power solely in the hands of the head of
state in his capacity as chief executive. The 1802
constitution provided for the establishment of
an advisory council in which all three branches
of government were represented. 1 Similarly,
the 1848 constitution provided for mandatory
consultation with the Conseil d'Etat, and in seri-
ous cases (i.e., convictions in the High Court)
the right to pardon was reserved to the Na-
tional Assembly. Finally, under the constitution
of the Fourth Republic, the power was vested in
the President sitting in the High Council of the
Judiciary, an indication that the power was not
13 The Cyprus constitution provides for a distribu-
tion of power between President and Vice-President,
reflecting the respective community affiliations of the
holders of these offices.
" The King or Queen (Belgium, the British Com-
monwealth, Denmark, Nepal, the Netherlands, and
Norway); the Prince (Monaco and Liechtenstein); the
Emperor (Japan); the Grand-Duke (Luxembourg);
the Amir (Kuwait) or the Yang di Pertuan Agong
(Malaysia).
' J. MONTEIL, LA GRACE EN DROIT FRANCAIS MOD-
ERNE 22 (1959) [hereinafter cited as MONTEIL].
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to be regarded as purely executive in nature. 6
In the United States the theory prevailed that
the power to grant clemency, like all other pow-
ers, ultimately resided with the people, who
were consequently able to delegate it to which-
ever body they chose.17 The identity of the
preferred body tended to vary from era to era.
During the pre-Independence period there
were three models for the institution of clem-
ency: (a) vesting the power in the governor; (b)
vesting the power in the governor acting only
with the consent of the Executive Council; (c)
vesting the power in the legislature. During the
period 1790-1860 there was a revival in public
trust in the executive, and twenty-one states
adopted model (a), while four preferred model
(b). Since 1860, in keeping with the increasing
professionalization of the pardoning power,
the majority of state constitutions have pro-
vided for some sort of autonomous board of
pardons having either formal decision-making
power or at least an advisory role in this re-
spect.
An analysis of the comparative table confirms
that attribution of the pardoning power to the
head of state-cum-chief executive is not univer-
sal. Under some constitutions the power is
vested in a collective body rather than in an
individual: the State Council in Bulgaria, the
German Democratic Republic, Poland, Ro-
mania and South Korea; the Praesidium of the
legislative assembly in Albania, Mongolia and
the Ukraine; the Presidential Council in Da-
homey and Hungary, the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council in Libya. Most of these bodies, as
their names sometimes indicate, perform tasks
akin to those of a president."
16 Under an earlier proposal the decision would
have belonged to the High Council of the Judiciary,
presided over by the President who would have had
equal voting rights. The proposed constitution con-
taining these provisions, however, was rejected by the
French people. See MONTEIL, supra note 15, at 33-34.
17 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES, VOL. III: PARDON 87-88 (1939) [herein-
after cited as 1939 SURVEY].
IS In the U.S.S.R. the Praesidium of the Supreme
Soviet "is the highest permanent functioning organ of
the State .... It performs all sorts of functions, and
defies the theory of Separation of Powers . . . It
performs functions, executive in character, which in
other countries are the prerogative of the Chief Exec-
utive, Head of the State, King, or President." S.
PATEL, World CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
185-86 (1970). Similarly, the State Council in Poland
fulfills the function of a collective head of state. See
PEASLEE, supra note 6, at 708.
Under the new Swedish constitution, on the
other hand, the pardoning power is vested in
the government as such. In Sweden, the execu-
tive body does not play the additional role of
head of state, a function still fulfilled by the
monarchy, now apparently deprived of any
substantial power 19
Finally, in a few countries the power to par-
don offenders is reserved exclusively to the
legislature. 2 This is the situation under the
constitutions of Switzerland, Uruguay and, for
some purposes, Turkey. In Nicaragua the
power is vested primarily in the legislature, but
supplementary powers are also granted to the
President and the judiciary.
It is thus evident that the clemency power is
not universally regarded as the sole prerogative
of the head of state. Indeed, the only clear
feature emerging from an analysis of the con-
stitutions included in the present survey is that
in no case is this power vested primarily2' in a
judicial authority. Nor does the model of the
head of state acting within the framework of a
judicial body22 appear to be prevalent today.
Since the role of the head of state is at times
ambiguous, the fact that the head of state may
be the sole repository of the clemency power
does not in itself unequivocally determine the
constitutional nature of the power. In historic
times, the sovereign ruler generally combined
the functions of all three branches of govern-
ment-executive, legislative and judicial-and
even as these functions became differentiated,
he continued to play a pivotal role in all three
branches. Thus the British Crown formally re-
" The Instrument of Government of 1974 refers to
the duties and the functions of the monarch, but does
not specify what they are. The intention of depriving
the monarchy of its powers, however, was evidenced
by a provision specifying that the articles of the con-
stitution relating to the monarchy would become ef-
fective only upon the death of the then-reigning
monarch.
20 It may be that in some jurisdictions vesting the
pardoning power in the executive or other body does
not deprive the legislature of an equivalent power. In
this connection see Weihofen, Legislative Pardons, 27
CAL. L. REV. 371 (1939); Radin, Legislative Pardons:
Another View, 27 CAL. L. REV. 387 (1939) [hereinafter
cited as Radin].
21 For a discussion of the bodies playing a secondary
role in the clemency decision, see text accompanying
notes 32-40 infra.
22 Under the constitution of France's Fifth Repub-
lic, the President no longer sits on the High Council
of the Judiciary when it issues clemency decisions. He
may, however, consult with the High Council.
[Vol. 68
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tains this threefold capacity today; and while
recent tradition identifies the prerogative of
mercy with the executive arm,H the historical
justification for this is not entirely clear. In an
earlier day, this prerogative was linked with the
Crown's control of criminal procedure: 4 the
King was, in Hume's view, "the fountain of
grace and mercy, as he is ofjustice. ' ' 25 There is
at least some ground here for identifying the
pardoning power with the judicial arm of gov-
ernment.
2 6
Similarly in the republics, the prevailing
model under which the power to pardon is
vested in the president does not obviate doubts
as to the character of this power, 27 because the
role of president varies considerably from state
to state.2 ' Thus, while the President of the
2 The widespread use of the expression "executive
clemency" reflects this notion. The control of the
prerogative of mercy in modern times by the Home
Secretary (see text accompanying note 36 infra) has
reinforced the association with the executive aim.
However see note 26 infra.
24 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
415 (1938), following Blackstone. The Crown's role in
the matter of clemency has also been described as the
'waiver of royal rights conceived as rights of prop-
erty." Radin, supra note 20, at 391.
" Cited in 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 130, n. 73 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
RADZINOWICZ].
26 The English case of Hanratty v. Lord Butler of
Saffron Walden, 115 Sol.J. 386 (1971), compared the
Home Secretary's immunity in respect of the pardon-
ing power with that ofjudges and advocates. Charac-
terization of the source of the pardoning power as
executive or otherwise (the "organic" criterion)
should, however, be differentiated from the charac-
terization of the exercise of this power (the "func-
tional" criterion). Applying the functional criterion,
many governmental acts are of a mixed character and
cannot readily be denominated as either "legislative,"
"executive," or 'judicial." KLINGHOFFER, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW (1957). In Israel, as in the United
States, the attorney general's discretionary power in
the matter of prosecution has been labeled by the
courts as "quasi-judicial."
27 In France, the immunity of the exercise of the
clemency powers from judicial review had always
been attributed to its classification as an "act of state."
In 1947, however, the Conseil d' Etat concluded that
immunity from judicial review derived from the judi-
cial character of the pardon. MONTEIL, supra note 15
at 56-57.
' Constitutions may be differentiated according to
the degree to which the executive is subject to the
control of the legislature, distinguishing the "presi-
dential-executive" model from the "parliamentary-
executive" model. L. WOLF-PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONS
OF MODERN STATES xix (1968). In states following the
latter model, the head of state is less likely to have
substantial political power.
United States serves simultaneously as head of
state and as the sole chief executive, 29 the presi-
dents of the Federal German Republic and of
Israel are for the most part symbolic figures,
the effective political power being wielded by
the Federal Chancellor and Prime Minister, re-
spectively. The French presidency fulfills a role
somewhere between these extremes, for al-
though the office of Prime Minister also exists
under the French constitution, substantial ex-
ecutive power is retained by the President."
This variance in the nature of the presiden-
tial role seems to add strength to the view that
the dominant tradition is essentially one of vest-
ing clemency powers in the head of state as such,
and not specifically in his capacity as chief exec-
utive. Thus, the Communist states which en-
trust these powers to a presidential or state
council, rather than to the Council of Ministers,
are substantially in keeping with this tradition.
The main exceptions remain those few jurisdic-
tions which seem reluctant to confide a power
to interfere with the judicial process in any
body other than the legislative assembly, which
in most systems is regarded as the ultimate
sovereign authority.3I
The preceding analysis has been confined to
a discussion of the formal vesting of the clem-
ency powers as reflected in basic constitutional
provisions. There are two reasons, however,
why the designated body may not necessarily
wield substantial power. First, the constitution
may expressly provide that the power is to be
exercised on the advice of some other body.
Secondly, even without such express provision,
the constitutional norms or practice of the indi-
vidual country may require that the acts of the
formal authority, especially those of a symbolic
head of state, require the sanction of a more
actively political figure. These situations will be
considered in the next section.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER BODIES IN THE
CLEMENCY DECISION
In most jurisdictions the clemency process
involves more than a petition from the offender
29 See also art. 5 of the Chad Constitution of 1962,
which specifies that "the President of the Republic
shall be the Head of State and of the Government."
" But with regard to his clemency powers, see note
27 supra.
"' In this respect, the legislature may be seen to
wear the mantle of the erstwhile monarch, whose
pardoning power was regarded as simply an incident
of his sovereignty. See 1939 SURVEY, supra note 17, at
1977]
directly to the pardoning body, followed by the
latter's decision. A more complex procedure is
usually adopted, involving the examination of
the petition and the issuing of an opinion on
the part of some other body. The question
arises as to the nature of such "secondary" bod-
ies and their power vis-a-vis the "primary" deci-
sion-making body.
Under some systems it is explicitly stated that
the ultimate decision belongs to the primary
body alone." Other systems, on the other
hand, specify that the primary pardoning au-
thority is not entitled to exercise this function of
his own accord, but is dependent on the initia-
tive or recommendation of another. This may
be provided for by the constitutional or other
statutory provisions33 relating to clemency. Al-
ternatively, the accepted constitutional practice
of the state (whether on a written or conven-
tional basis) may require that the powers of the
primary authority-especially where this au-
thority is no more than a political figurehead-
be exercised only in accordance with the wishes
of the government or its appointee.3 4
It is, indeed, most frequently the executive
arm which is designated as the "recommend-
ing" body. This is the case under the constitu-
tions of Austria, Greece, the Irish Republic,
Japan, New Zealand, Niger, Rhodesia, Singa-
pore, South Africa and Sri Lanka. In these
cases it seems clear that the "secondary" author-
ity has been granted the effective decision-mak-
ing power.35 In Great Britain, on the other
hand, it is the constitutional convention which
has transferred effective power from the
Crown to the Home Secretary.
3 6
Under many constitutions no such advisory
role is explicitly attributed to the government
or its representatives. The same result is
87. The modern trend, however, is to attribute sover-
eignty to the people. See, e.g., art. 4 of the Constitu-
tion of Uruguay.
32 The Zambian Constitution provides that the
President acts "in his own deliberate judgement and
shall not be obliged to follow the advice tendered by
any other person or authority."
33 The constitutional provisions themselves fre-
quently state that the constitutional powers will be
exercised "in accordance with the law."
3 See, e.g., art. 67 of the Austrian constitution.
Except, perhaps, in the case of Niger, where the
language is somewhat equivocal.
" The development of this convention during the
course of the past two centuries is described in F.
BRESLER, REPRIEVE (1965).
achieved in practice, however, by the device of
ministerial countersignature. These constitu-
tions specify that decisions emanating from the
primary authority require the countersignature
of the prime minister, or the minister responsi-
ble for the matter to which the decision relates,
or both. Such a requirement appears, inter alia,
in the constitutions of Belgium, Burundi, Italy,
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Spain and
Turkey. It also appears in some constitutions
(Austria, Greece and South Africa) in which
another governmental authority is designated
as enjoying a "recommending" capacity, fur-
ther emphasizing the role of this authority in
the clemency process.
It is sometimes specified,37 and nearly always
implied, that the absence of the required coun-
tersignature would render the clemency deci-
sion nugatory. Further, since the effect of such
countersignature is to render the countersign-
ing minister or ministers responsible for the
decision, 38 the view is generally held by the
governments or ministers concerned that even
if no "advisory" role is imputed to them by the
constitution, they are nevertheless entitled to
an effective and perhaps decisive say in the
pardoning decision. The French Minister of
Justice, M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, once stated
that his obligation to countersign presidential
clemency orders did not depend upon his con-
curring with their content, which remained
within the exclusive prerogative of the Presi-
dent.39 A happier solution, in this writer's view,
is that obtaining in the Congo (and formerly
11 Art. 75 of the Chilean constitution specifies that
all orders of the President of the Republic must be
signed by the minister of the respective department,
and "shall not be obeyed without this essential re-
quirement."
31 Such responsibility is generally understood to be
political, but under some systems may also connote
legal responsibility. J. Laferribre, Le Contreseing Minis-
triel, in LA REVUE GE NgRALE D' ADMINISTRATION 39
(1908).
11 See MONTEIL, supra note 15, at 46-47. The siiua-
tion in Israel in this respect has been analyzed in L.
Sebba, Pardon and Amnesty-Juridical and Penolog-
ical Aspects (1975) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Uni-
versity of Jerusalem) (hereinafter cited as Sebba,
1975]. where it was concluded that the intention of
the basic law was to vest effective decision-making
power in the President despite the requirement of a
ministerial countersignature.A "middle" view, advo-
cated by Professor Klinghoffer, regards the clemency
decision as an example of a "composite act." See also
H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 95-
96 (1945).
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also in Dahomey), where the requirement of a
ministerial countersignature for acts per-
formed by the President is dispensed within
the exercise of the pardoning power. Just as the
requirement of the countersignature is often
waived for the appointment or dismissal of
ministers, so too, a distinction could be made
between purely formal duties of state, where
the requirement would apply, and functions
involving a genuine exercise of presidential
prerogative powers, where it would not.
Recommendations do not emanate exclu-
sively from executive sources. They also may
issue from bodies of ajudicial, quasi-judicial or
legislative character. Some constitutions (Al-
geria, Upper Volta, Zaire) follow the French
model and bestow an advisory role on the High
Council of the Judiciary. In Chad such a role is
granted to the Supreme Court itself. In Viet-
nam, on the other hand, a special committee of
the National Assembly exists for this purpose.
Finally, some constitutions provide for the es-
tablishment of an Advisory Committee on the
Prerogative of Mercy (Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda,
Zambia), a Pardons Board (Malaysia), a High
Council of Pardons (Ivory Coast) or other con-
sultative council (Greece). The body designated
by the constitution for an advisory role may
thus be associated with any of the three
branches of government, or it may constitute
an ad hoc combination.
It should be again emphasized that the actual
power of these "secondary" bodies in the deci-
sion-making process may vary considerably.4 0
The formulation of the constitutional provi-
sions may not be decisive in this respect.
Finally, it should be pointed out that under
most systems there will exist some machinery
for investigating the circumstances of the indi-
vidual petitions. Such investigation may be re-
quired of a particular body, perhaps judicial,
whose purpose is less to advise than to gather or
sift the information on the basis of which a
decision can subsequently be made. The role of
these investigative bodies-a few of which ap-
pear in the fifth column of the table below-will
rarely be mentioned in the constitutional provi-
sions, and their status may best be labeled "ter-
tiary."
40 The role of the consultative council in Greece is
clearly subsidiary to that of the Minister of Justice.
Even though consultation with the council is manda-
tory, it should rather be classified as a "tertiary" body.
SPECIAL CATEGORIES
The constitutional provisions relating to par-
don are usually stated in general terms, which
do not indicate the precise scope of the pardon-
ing power. Questions as to the applicability of
pardons to disciplinary offences or to adminis-
trative penalties are left to supplementary legis-
lation or judicial interpretation. On the other
hand, in at least two special areas, it is not
unusual to find express reference to certain
categories of offence, offender or penalty.
The first area is that of political crimes. Here
the special provisions may apply to political
offences in general, but often relate specifically
to proceedings of impeachment involving
members of the government. In such cases,
restrictions are imposed upon the exercise of
the pardoning power. Clearly a system which
provides for impeachment proceedings as a
means of exercising legislative control over the
executive would be frustrated if the executive
could simply void the proceedings at will by
granting pardons. For this reason the applica-
tion of the pardoning power to impeachment
proceedings is often made dependent upon the
initiative or the consent of the legislative body.
Such is the case in Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg. In
Finland the initiative must come from the High
Court of Impeachment. Under the Chilean
constitution, the pardoning power is itself re-
served to Congress in such cases. In Norway the
only form of clemency which may be exercised
in cases of impeachment is the commutation of
the death penalty.
41
As to the application of the pardoning power
to political offences in general, the philosophy
expressed in the constitutional provisions is far
from uniform. For while Liberia excludes all
political offences from the President's power to
pardon, in Colombia and Panama a power to
pardon is granted to the President only in rela-
tion to political offences. In Nicaragua the par-
doning power is exercised with greater facility
in these cases. The Congress can pardon politi-
cal offenders without the initiative on the part
of the executive required in other cases, and
the President may also grant such pardons
when the Congress is adjourned. Finally, in
New Zealand and Queensland it is provided




that the pardoning of political offenders may
be made conditional on their banishment.
The other area in which special provisions
are frequently found is that of the death pen-
alty. The most usual type of provision man-
dates that capital punishment cases be reviewed
by the body or bodies whose task it is to con-
sider applications for pardon. This applies, for
example, to the Advisory Committees on the
Prerogative of Mercy in Kenya, Malawi,
Uganda and Zambia, as well as to the appropri-
ate authorities in Malta, Singapore and Sri
Lanka. In Jordan all death sentences require
the confirmation of the King. The object of all
these provisions is clearly to ensure that, where
the ultimate penalty is to be inflicted, no case
deserving of consideration by the clemency au-
thorities will be overlooked as the result of a
failure on the part of the defendant to submit a
petition, or for want of adequate investigation.
On the other hand are the provisions obtain-
ing in New Zealand, where the death penalty
can be commuted only by a decision of the
Executive Council and in Turkey, where the
decision must be made by the legislative assem-
bly. These models appear to indicate a harsher
policy towards capital cases, since the decision-
making power has been vested in a more formal
body.
TYPES OF PARDON
As indicated in the introductory section, the
institution of pardon is an ancient one, and
throughout history it has served a number of
functions, according to the needs of particular
legal systems at particular times. It is not there-
fore surprising that a multitude of terms were
applied to the clemency function and that their
usage has not always been consistent. Thus, in
the English language alone, the following terms
are encountered: free pardon, full pardon,
conditional pardon, commutation, remission,
reprieve, respite, amnesty, clemency, mercy.
By way of illustrating the problematic nature
of the terminology, a comparative observation
may be made regarding the laws prevailing in
the United States, England and Israel respec-
tively. The United States Constitution followed
the English jurists in providing for reprieves and
pardons.42 The term pardon is used in a generic
sense, and apparently includes both reduction
or remission of sentence as well as commuta-
42 U.S. CONsT. art. II, Sec. 2.
tion, but not reprieves, which are specified in-
dependently. In England, on the other hand,
the term "commutation" was never generally
adopted. The substitution of one penalty for
another was included in the rubric of the "con-
ditional pardon." It was thus not surprising that
the Israeli Supreme Court, faced with a law
providing for "pardons and reductions of sen-
tences, 43 examined both English and Ameri-
can sources, but was unable to reach unanimity
on the question as to whether commutations
were included.
44
The majority of constitutions do not directly
address these questions. Instead, the precise
forms which the clemency power may take are
left to regular or even subsidiary legislation, or
to judicial interpretation. It was the practice in
British colonial legislation, however, to specify
the various forms of clemency, and this model
can still be found in the basic provisions of
Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zambia.
The forms commonly specified in these juris-
dictions are (a) pardon, free or conditional; (b)
respite of execution for a specified or indeter-
minate period; (c) substitution of a less severe
form of punishment (commutation);4 1 (d) re-
mission of the whole or part of the punishment.
The last type usually specifies that remission
may apply to any penalty or forfeiture incurred
for any offence, and this would appear to in-
clude sanctions incurred by way of administra-
tive proceedings.
The legal provisions which describe the var-
ious types of pardon rarely specify the objective
for which each type is intended. 46 In this re-
spect the fourfold typology mentioned in the
last paragraph is consistent with the impression
created by the clemency provisions of most le-
gal systems, namely that they are designed to
43 Section 6 of the Transition Law (1949).
44 F.H.13/60, Attorney General v. Matarra, 16
P.D.430. Agranat, J., took the view that the commtt-
tation of sentences fell within the President's pardon-
ing power, but that reprieves did not. The court
settled the issue by construing the case before it as a
conditional pardon. The issue was ultimately resolved
by the legislature, which redefined the President's
powers to include commutation. See § 11(b) of the
Basic Law: President of the State (1964).
41 This type is not specified in the provisions of
New Zealand and Singapore. As mentioned above,
however, commutation was traditionally achieved in
England by means of the conditional pardon.
46 One notable exception relates to the pardon of
accomplices; see text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
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facilitate a post-convictional modification of
judgment, usually because of changes in the
offender's personal conduct or circumstances,
or possibly because of doubts relating to the
propriety of his conviction. The last considera-
tion is more evident in jurisdictions influenced
by the common law, since a "free pardon" im-
plies some form of corrective to the conviction
itself.47 The French gr&e, on the other hand, is
concerned exclusively with the punishment.
The main reason for this difference between
the two systems is that the French legal system
developed a separate remedy for suspected
miscarriages of justice: rivision, or retrial. This
is a special form of court proceeding which may
be instigated for specified reasons.48 This insti-
tution is generally foreign to the common-law
countries, 49 which rely on the pardoning power
to accomplish this purpose.50 In this connection
it may be mentioned that the Mexican constitu-
tion has adopted a middle road and distin-
guishes pardons "of necessity," which will be
automatically granted on proof of miscarriage
of justice, from pardons "of grace," which are
discretionarily granted for outstanding services
to the state.5 1 In the former case, specified
grounds of application are laid down which are.
almost identical with the grounds for applying
for revision under French law.
Another objective of the pardon reflected in
the clemency provisions of some countries re-
lates to the role of criminal accomplices. The
clemency provisions of New Zealand, Singa-
pore and Sri Lanka state that an accomplice
47 The extent to which a pardon serves to eliminate
all the adverse effects of a conviction has been a topic
of considerable debate in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out
Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1915); Weihofen, The
Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 177 (1939).
48 In brief, these reasons include: (a) the live ap-
pearance of the "victim" of a homicide; (b) the convic-
tion of another defendant for the same offence, re-
vealing an inconsistency; (c) the conviction for per-
jury of one of the witnesses at the original trial; (d)
the emergence of new evidence indicating the ac-
cused's innocence.
49 Israel has attempted to merge both legal tradi-
tions in this area; see, Courts Law § 9 (1957).
50 The manner in which the clemency powers have
been exercised to remedy miscarriages of justice has
been the subject of concern in recent years. See Jus-
TICE, HOME OFFICE REVIEWS OF CRIMINAL CONVIC-
TIONS (1968).
"' Compare the old English distinction between
"pardons of course and right," and "pardons of
grace"; M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 250 (1678).
who provides information leading to the con-
viction of the principal offender may be par-
doned. This type of pardon appears to be con-
fined exclusively to countries influenced by the
common law. It reflects a practice which was
considered the mainstay of the English criminal
justice system during the end of the eighteenth
and the beginning of the nineteenth centu-
ries.5 2 It was thought that only by making such
an offer to the accomplice could the principal
be apprehended and convicted. 5 This practice,
however, was the subject of much controversy
and has since fallen into desuetude. The mod-
ern system of "turning King's (State's) evi-
dence" is no longer conditional on the grant of
a pardon. Nevertheless, as noted, many hith-
erto colonial jurisdictions still retain this form
of pardon, at least formally.
As a concluding note on this topic, it should
be observed that this type of pardon, apart
from being controversial as a matter of policy,
also has an unusual feature from the formal
point of view. It is the only form of pardon
designed specifically for offenders-or rather
for suspects-who have not yet been convicted
by the courts. Most otherjurisdictions preclude
any exercise of clemency prior to conviction;
5 4
and even some jurisdictions providing for the
pardon of accomplices (e.g., New Zealand) do
not allow for pre-convictional pardon in any
other case.
Another purpose of the pardoning power in
some jurisdictions is to remove the stigma of
past convictions. Here the clemency power is
usually invoked a considerable period of time
after the sentence has been served, and the
offender has had an opportunity to prove that
he has earned his reinstatement as a first-class
citizen. In recent years, the increasing sensitiv-
" See Radzinowicz, supra note 25, Vol. II at 53.
131d. It was even thought necessary to offer a
financial reward as further inducement to the accom-
plice.
' The provisions themselves may specify applica-
tion to "convicted offenders" or "penalties"; or the
traditional interpretation of the clemency institution,
as in the case of the French grace, may be so limited.
The U.S. Constitution, on the other hand, which
refers only to "offences," is thought to permit pre-
convictional pardons, as illustrated by the Nixon case.
Czechoslovakia and Liechtenstein also provide for the
suspension or cancellation of criminal proceedings as
part of the clemency power, while in Iceland the
President may order the withdrawal of a prosecution




ity to the need for removing the stigma at-
tached to the ex-offender has given rise to a
number of attempts to produce a comprehen-
sive solution to this problem. Included among
these attempts are expunging the criminal re-
cord;"3 providing for its non-disclosure after a
specified period of time has passed since the
conviction was imposed or the sentence
served;-" or the use of special evidentiary rules
based on similar considerations." The French
system, and those which it has influenced, have
long maintained a special institution for this
purpose, la rihabilitation, where rights can be
restored either byjudicial decision or, in minor
cases, by automatic operation of law. Other
systems, however, including some which are
only now adopting one of the alternative solu-
tions indicated above, have used the pardoning
power to this end. In some cases, such as Bel-
gium and Japan, this objective is prominently
mentioned in the statutory provisions relating
to the pardoning power. In the last instance at
least, "legal" rehabilitation can be regarded not
as an incidental consequence of pardon, but as
one of its major forms.
Consideration of the types of pardon existing
under various systems around the world cannot
be concluded without some reference to amnes-
ties. The current survey does not purport to
deal with the subject of amnesties, since amnes-
ties are analytically distinct from pardons from
a juridical point of view and are so dominated
by their political connotations that they seem to
have little in common with other forms of clem-
ency. The relationship of amnesty to these
forms of clemency, however, must be clarified
here.
The term "amnesty" generally connotes an
institution differentiated from pardon in the
following respects: (a) it is general, in that it
applies to categories of offenders and not to
named individuals; (b) it removes the effects of
the conviction and not merely of the sentence;
' See generally Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences
of Conviction and Their Removal, 59 J. CRIM. L.C.
P.S. 347 (1968).
36 See Israel's Criminal Registration Bill (1975), and
similar proposals in various jurisdictions in the
United States, such as Pennsylvania.
57 See England's Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
(1974), which renders evidence of "old" convictions
(determined on the basis of given criteria) inadmissi-
ble in court.
-8 For Belgium, see art. 87 of the Penal Code; for
Japan, see The Offenders Rehabilitation Law (1949).
and (c) it applies primarily to political of-
fences. 9 As a result of these differences, many
constitutions exclude the power to grant am-
nesty from the clemency power vested in the
head of state or chief executive, and grant it
instead to the legislature. This has almost be-
come an additional identifying characteristic of
an amnesty. Typical examples of constitutions
reserving the right of amnesty to the legisla-
ture, while vesting the power to pardon in the
head of state, are Finland, Jordan, the Nether-
lands and Panama. Other constitutions, how-
ever, such as those of Burma and the German
Democratic Republic, recognize the distinction
between pardons and amnesties, but vest both
powers in the same body.
60
The English common law, however, has
never developed the concept of an amnesty.
The historical practice of passing Acts of Grace
has ceased,6 ' and the occasional need for an
amnesty of prisoners is met today through the
exercise of executive clemency powers. Simi-
larly, under American law, because the Consti-
tution refers only to pardons and reprieves, it
was uncertain which branch of government
would have the power to grant amnesty and
how far its effects would differ from those of a
pardon.62 In practice, amnesty proclamations
have on occasion been made by the President,
sometimes supported by Congressional ac-
tion .3
Further confusion has been created by the
concept of the "general" or "collective" pardon.
59 In recent times there has been criticism of the
practice of granting amnesties for non-political off-
ences in some countries. "Ils ont ainsi fait de
'amnistie, dans certain cas, une sorte de grice ou de
rehabilitation,jetant ainsi le trouble dans la technique
juridique" (Thus, they have made amnesty, in certain
cases, a kind of pardon or rehabilitation, throwing
the confusion into the judicial procedure.). P.
BOUZAT & J. PINATEL, TRAIT9 Dr DROIT PLNAL ET tE
CRIMINOLOGIE 685 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
BOuzAT & PINATEL].
60 In some of these instances, where the term am-
nesty is coupled in the same provision with the par-
doning powers, it may also appear in the comparative
table as a "type of pardon." Since this may reflect no
more than an accident of drafting or classification,
undue significance should not be attributed to these
cases.
61 See ERSKINE MAY'S PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE
(18th ed. B. Cocks 1971).
62 See L.C.K., The Power of the President to Grant a
General Pardon orAmnestyfor Offenses Against the United
States, 8 AM. L. REG. 513 (N.S.) (1969).
" Migliore, Amnesty: An Historical Justification for Its
Continuing Viability, 12 J. FAM. L. 63 (1872).
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These terms ostensibly indicate acts resembling
a pardon in all respects save that the benefici-
aries are designated by category rather than on
an individual basis. 64 Some legal systems, there-
fore, assimilate the general pardon with the
regular pardoning power, and distinguish it
from amnesty. For example, the Belgian king
has the power to grant not only individual, but
also collective pardons, while the right to grant
amnesty is reserved to the legislature. In other
jurisdictions, however, the generality of the
power is the critical feature. Thus, under the
constitution of Chile, which vests the individual
pardoning power in the President, general par-
dons are classified with amnesties and fall
within the prerogative of the legislature.65
Conceptual uncertainty is compounded by
the linguistic translation of terminology in-
volved in a survey such as the one upon which
the current analysis is based, as well as by the
translation of the very concepts and institutions
themselves from one system to another. Thus,
the Hebrew expression usually used to denote
amnesty literally means "general pardon," and
differentiation between the effects of amnesty
and pardon under Israeli law becomes diffi-
cult. 66 This problem is aggravated in countries,
including Israel, which have been influenced
by the common law. At common law, one of the
functions of the pardon is to undo the effects
of a conviction, a result which is generally
seen as the identifying characteristics of am-
nesty. 67
64 These pardons normally take the form of a re-
duction in the length of prison sentences in honor of
some national or royal celebration. They are thus
distinct in character from the political amnesty. Un-
like individual pardons, however, their rationale is to
be found in the special situation or mood of the
benefactor, rather than in the circumstances of the
beneficiary.
65 The term "general pardon" sometimes refers to
the practice of granting a number of pardons to
named individuals at the same time. Examples of this
are the French grdces gdnirales annuelles, and the par-
dons granted three times per year in the Dominican
Republic. See comparative table. Such pardons are
analytically indistinguishable from individual par-
dons and must be differentiated from the grdces collec-
tives discussed above.
66 See Sebba, 1975, supra note 39. Conversely, the
individual pardon under Japanese law is generally
translated as "special amnesty."
67 Since the Israeli Amnesty Law of 1967 had a
"saving" clause which restricted its effects to those
expressly provided within the statute itself, the effects
were less far-reaching than those of a pardon. Under
Finally, reference must be made to two other
"hybrid" institutions. First, the term indulto,
which appears in legal literature of the Spanish
speaking countries, is generally the equivalent
of the French grdce. In Uruguay, however, in-
dulto, like amnistia, is a legislative prerogative,
gracia being granted by the High Court (in
military cases by the President). Similarly, in
Italy the government is empowered to pass leg-
islation granting either amnesty or indulto, the
legal outcome of the latter resembling that of
the presidential pardon (grazia).6s Secondly, in
the French legal literature the expressions grdce
amnistiante or grdce amnistielle are encountered.
These refer to a discretionary power, vested in
the President or the government under an am-
nesty law, to apply amnesty to selected individ-
uals falling within certain categories.6 9 Analyti-
cally, therefore, this is a form of amnesty.
70
EFFECTS OF PARDON
The aspect of the pardoning power which
probably attracts the most attention in the legal
literature of the individual countries concerns
the legal effects of the pardon. No attempt will
be made to deal with this topic comprehensively
within the framework of this analysis. There
are two reasons for this: first, the problems
arising are too manifold, and the solutions de-
veloped by the various jurisdictions too diffuse
to bear systematic comparison. Second, the
norms applicable in this area are not usually
found in the constitutions, but rather in regular
codes, special statutes relating to pardons, or in
the case law.
Accordingly, this analysis will be confined to
three observations. First, the civil law systems,
as indicated earlier, generally emphasize that
Israeli law, the effects of a pardon have been held to
include the obligation of the state to repay a fine
imposed as a result of the offense to which the par-
don relates. Under civil law systems, the effects of an
amnesty are, of course, much more extensive that
those of a pardon, which is normally confined to that
portion of the punishment remaining executory.
1s See 3 V. MANZINI, TRATTATO Di DIRITTO PENALE
ITALIANO 405, 480-491 (4th ed. 1961).
69 It has been doubted whether the Presidential
function actually allows such delegation. See MON-
TEiL, supra note 15, at 204.
70 Terming this power a form of pardon may have
the effect of imposing undesirable limitations on its
scope and applicability. For this reason recent amnes-
ties generally use a formulation which omits any ref-




the pardon affects only the penalty served by
the offender and does not affect other conse-
quences of his conviction. Second, following
the same principle, most systems specify that
the rights of third parties shall not be affected
by the pardon, in particular the right of the
victim to compensation, whether as a result of
civil or criminal proceedings. Third, there is an
inherent desire that the consequences of a par-
don should be consistent with its objectives.
This goal presents considerable problems for
the common law jurisdictions where the pur-
poses of the pardon are diffuse and where a
result appropriate for one purpose will be inap-
propriate for others.7
1
Some other aspects of the pardoning power
appear in the comparative table, but too spo-
radically to allow for systematic analysis. For
example, data are occasionally available on the
statistics for the petitions for and granting of
pardons.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
There are a number of reasons for abolishing
the pardoning power in the modern world,
reasons based on the democratization of politi-
cal power on the one hand and attainments in
penal reform on the other. Nevertheless, this
institution remains an integral part of the con-
stitutional scheme in almost every jurisdiction.
The decision-making power continues to be
vested most frequently in the head of state or
chief executive. The most common alternative,
mainly in Communist countries, vests the par-
doning power in an executive or presidential
body. The democratization of political power
has merely resulted in a tendency for formal
heads of state to share or transfer their effective
authority to governmental figures who are
more directly accountable to the legislature
and/or to the electorate. This is achieved either
through the designation of governmental min-
isters as advisors, or by the device of the coun-
" Some of the leading cases in these jurisdictions
relate to the question of whether a pardon restores
the right of the member of a professional body or a
license-holder to his former status. See, e.g., the Eng-
lish case of Hay v. Tower Division of London J.J. 24
Q.B.D. 561 (1890); the American case Ex parte Gar-
land, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); the Israeli case of
H.Ct. 177/50, Reuven v. Chairman & Members of
Law Council, 5 P.D. 737.
tersignature. The impact of penal reform is
sometimes reflected in the appointment of spe-
cial advisory pardon boards or in the reliance
on prior investigations by criminal justice per-
sonnel. The main exceptions to the general
pattern are (a) the nations which vest the par-
doning power in the legislature alone, a system
which appears inconsistent with the flexibility
normally attributed to the clemency power, and
(b) the recent Chinese constitution which omits
all reference to clemency.
The typology of pardons differs widely, par-
ticularly between the common law and civil law
systems, and also reflects the purposes and ef-
fects of the exercise of clemency. Common law
systems use the pardon for a wide variety of
purposes, such as rectifying miscarriages of jus-
tice and the rehabilitation of ex-offenders,
whereas the civil law systems have developed
alternative institutions for these purposes.
However, common law systems are now mov-
ing in the same direction of specialization of
function. This is another result of a profession-
alized penal system, in which the pardon essen-
tially fulfills a supplementary role. Even if the
role of the pardon is merely residuary, nations
seem to show little inclination to dispense with
the institution altogether.
Two areas of application in particular attract
the attention of drafters of constitutions such
that special provisions are considered neces-
sary: capital cases and political offences. The
first has been undergoing a decline but, like the
pardon itself, shows great reluctance to disap-
pear entirely. Provisions under certain consti-
tutions for mandatory consideration of clem-
ency in all capital cases will therefore probably
continue to be of significance. The importance
of political offences, on the other hand, seems
to be increasing. While the special provisions in
this area mostly serve to limit the scope of the
pardon, such restrictions are generally con-
fined only to the matter of ministerial impeach-
ment. Further, with the increasing politiciza-
tion of "common" crimes, it may be that the
role of clemency will expand in this area.
Finally, it should be emphasized that there
are certain pitfalls in the type of analysis con-
ducted here, involving broad comparisons and
a search for trends and patterns between the
legal systems of some one hundred countries.
Apparent or formal similarities between sys-
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tems might conceal practical differences which
would only emerge on closer scrutiny of the
systems concerned, while apparent differences
might disappear. The present survey is not a
substitute for a detailed study of the dynamics
of the pardoning mechanism in individual
countries, including an analysis of the cases or
types of cases in which pardons are actually
granted. Where pardons are used as a tool in
the reformation of the offender-and this is
their most common function today-an evalua-
tion of their effectiveness for this purpose
would not be amiss.
7 2
72 The present writer was able to undertake an
empirical evaluation of the effects of an amnesty in
Israel, but no comparable evaluations of the effects of
executive clemency seems to have ever been con-
ducted.
